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THE PERMANENCE OF CONsTITixo.NAny
IT has long been the common notion that a state or federal statute, once
declared either constitutional or unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,
remains so indefinitely. The notion has been fostered by opinions which
have explained constitutional rulings in terms of absolute principles and
logical syllogisms. It is true that extra-legal facts, subject though they be
to change, have been recognized in constitutional argument; but their im-
port, wherever it has influenced decision, has habitually been crowded into
hard-and-fast legal phrases, so that the point as to constitutionality, once
written, has seemed permanently written. Two cases decided by the Court
at its present term bear directly upon the permanence of constitutionality.
In Abie State Bank v. Weaver,1 the Court was confronted with a Nebraska
statute compelling state banks to contribute to a depositors' insurance fund.
The Court had considered and sustained the same statute in Shallcnbcrgcr v.
First State Bank 2 twenty years before. At that time, complaint had been
made that the assessments for the fund amounted to a taking of property
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31r. Justice Holmes, in Noble
State Bank v. Haskell,3 a companion opinion, had then explained that com-
pulsory bank insurance laws fell on the right side of "the line where what
is called the police power of the states is limited by the constitution." Thus
the cry of "confiscation" had been countered by the equally abstract justi-
fication, "police power." In the Abie State Bank: case, protest again found
its legal basis in the Fourteenth Amendment. Special assessments made
under a later amendment to the statute, it was said, had proved an un-
warranted burden upon solvent banks, while the fund remained inadequate
to meet the demands of the many banks which had failed during the depres-
sion. The Court, instead of dismissing the case summarily with a reference
to the Shallenberger decision, indicated that the new facts might well have
led it to grant the injunction sought against future assessments, had not the
state itself made provision for an orderly liquidation of the entire scheme.
31r. Chief Justice Hughes, writing the opinion, commented that "a police
regulation, although valid when made, may become, by reason of later events,
arbitrary and confiscatory."
In Missouri Pacifei Railroad v. Norwood,4 the Court was asked to enjoin
the enforcement of two Arkansas statutes, one regulating freight train
crews, the other railroad switching crews. Each statute had once been be-
fore the Court in exactly the same form. Each had been declared valid in
the face of constitutional objections.5 The new protests varied from the
old only in the presentation of changed conditions since the earlier decisions.
The Court, after a thorough review of the matter, held that the facts did
'51 Sup. Ct. 252 (1931).
2 219 U. S. 114, 31 Sup. Ct. 189 (1911).
3219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
4 U. S. Daily, April 15, 1931, at 377.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 31 Sup. Ct. 275




not overbalance a presumption of statutory validity. Mr. Justice Butler, in
a matter-of-fact opinion, failed to comment upon the re-consideration of
identical statutes, apparently passing it over as an accepted practice.
Yet the Chief Justice, in support of his statement concerning the tempo-
rary validity of "police regulations," cited only utility rate cases.0 In
these, the theory of re-consideration has been that the commission to which
the statute delegated regulatory powers might have failed to adapt its
orders to changing conditions-not that the delegating act, once held valid,
might since have become unconstitutional. Thus rate schedules declared
confiscatory are sent back for adjustment to the same commission acting
under the same law. The Abie State Bank case, at its most conservative
interpretation, puts orders made according to the specific terms of a slight
statutory amendment in the same class with those made under a general
grant of regulatory power. The Missouri Pacific case can only be inter-
preted as extending to a self-sufficient and unamended statute the same pos-
sibility of obsolescence in the light of new conditions.
The real significance of the two decisions lies in the opportunity they have
opened for reverse application in the future. If the march of events can
make a constitutional law unconstitutional, a law which has once been de-
clared invalid may similarly ripen to constitutionality. Surely, a Supreme
Court rule of review, if it work at all, must work both ways. IAnalagous
precedent is found in one of the very passages cited by the Chief Justice,
where it is said that "a rate order which is confiscatory when made may
cease to be confiscatory, or one which is valid when made may become con-
fiscatory at a later period." 7 In fact, not if the Court had so intended
could it have pointed a clearer path to official vindication of social laws
which have in the past been declared in conflict with the constitution. More-
over, the present Court's demand for extra-legal facts to disprove constitu-
tionality, strikingly expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in O'Gornian and
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,8 was reiterated by Mr. Justice But-
ler in the Missouri Pacific case. Thus, were a minimum wage law, for ex-
ample, to come before the Court again, it would stand with a presumption
of validity in its favor, and its opponents would now be forced to challenge
it with facts instead of legal theories. To the citing of the Adkins 9 decision
as allegedly decisive of the constitutional point, the ready answer would be
a reference to the Abie State Bank and Missouri Pacific cases as proof that
a constitutional ruling may grow stale with the shift of economic conditions.
Then the lapse of time between cases may come to be the only index of the
permanence of constitutionality.
'-Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133, 51 Sup. Ct. 65
(1930) ; Allen v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 230 U. S. 553, 33 Sup. Ct. 1030
(1913) ; Lincoln Gas & Electric Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454
(1919).
The Chief Justice might have found a closer analogy in the emergency
rent law cases. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921).
But here legislative intent specifically limited the relief to a temporary
measure, and it was specifically upheld as such. Whereas customarily,
neither the statute, nor the application of the "police power" concept to
uphold it, has been so restricted.
7 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., supra note 6, at 162, 51 Sup. Ct. at
73.
8 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931).
9 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923)
(District of Columbia minimum wage law for women held invalid as con-
flicting with constitutional "freedom of contract").
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STATE EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS rom5 LOCAL Busun-SS
THE oft assumed doctrine that a state may exclude foreign corporations
from doing business within its borders, has been directly applied for the
first time by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Railway Excprcss
Agency v. Virginia.2 Relying on a clause of the Virginia Constitution for-
bidding the authorization of a foreign corporation to conduct a public serv-
ice business, the state corporation commission had refused to allow a foreign
interstate carrier, functioning as a joint facility of railroads throughout
the country, to engage in local express transportation. In unanimously
sustaining the ruling the Court did not ignore the company's contention
that the exclusion amounted to a burden on its interstate commerce, but
held simply that there was insufficient evidence of such a burden to over-
throw the presumption of constitutionality.3
The validity of the constitutional clause was further challenged, how-
ever, for the reason that reincorporation within Virginia would deprive
the appellant of its right as a foreign corporation to invoke the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts.4 The Supreme Court's strug-
gle with the relation of foreign corporations to the diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction presents an interesting chapter in constitutional history. It
was early decided that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning
of the constitutional provision extending federal judicial power to contro-
versies "between citizens of different states." 3 From the practical results
of this interpretation the Court has, after much difficulty and without
swerving from the verbal doctrine, managed to escape by the cumbersome
device of disregarding the corporate entity, basing jurisdiction on the citi-
zenship of the stockholders, and conclusively presuming that the stockhold-
ers were all citizens of the state of incorporation.0 On this bed of quick-
sand an imposing structure of constitutional adjudication has been built.7
Attempts by the states to retain in their own courts litigation concerning
foreign corporations were, after some intermediate success, completely re-
pulsed by the invention of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." s
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (U. S. 1839); Lafayette
Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 407 (U. S. 1855); Paul v. Virginia,
8 Wall. 168, 181 (U. S. 1868); cf. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445
(U. S. 1874) ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
2 51 Sup. Ct. 201 (1931), aff'g 153 Va. 498, 150 S. E. 419 (1929).
3 O'Gorman v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931), noted
in 40 YALE L. J. 657.
4 Appellan's brief went somewhat further than was necessary in assert-
ing that this deprivation was a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
See Isaacs, Federal Protection of Foreign Corporations in American Con-
stitutionl Law (1926) 26 COL. L. RLv. 263, 280-281. As the court drew no
distinction between public service and private corporations, the holding of
the instant case would seem to be 'applicable to foreign corporations gen-
erally. More cogent reasons exist for state exclusion of foreign public
service corporations, however, than of private industrial corporations.
"Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U. S. 1809).
6 Marshall v. B. & 0. Ry., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853).
7 Brown, The Jurisdictiom of the Federal Courts Based on Divcrsity of
Citizenshkip (1929) 78 PA. L. REv. 179, 189-191.
8 Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188 (1922);
and Note (1922) 20 MIcE. L. REV. 897; HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOR-
EIGN CORPORTIONS IN AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1918) c 8; Merrill,
Unconstitutional Conditions (1928) 77 U. or PA. L. REV. 549.
By the use of this device the Supreme Court has been able to invalidate
statutes requiring an agreement not to remove suits to federal courts as
a prerequisite to admission to local business,) statutes visiting the penalty
of expulsion from local business in the event of such a removal,'0 and
statutes imposing domestic status on foreign corporations doing local
business."-
Behind this zealousness to safeguard the foreign corporation's access to
federal courts lies, perhaps, the supposed necessity of protecting capital
moving from financial centers to "backward states" where a prejudice
against foreign corporations is vaguely presumed to exist. In none of
these cases was the state's absolute power to exclude foreign corporations
from local business questioned. But, where the denial of privileges granted
by the Federal Constitution and Statutes was so open, the Court, perhaps
with a view to save dignity, was able to see a perversion of this "absolute"
power to unconstitutional ends.'- The principal case indicates a method
by which the states may attain by indirection that restriction on federal
jurisdiction which was inhibited when sought by direct means. To confine
local business to domestic corporations constitutes no patent denial of fed-
eral rights, and so long as the absolute power of exclusion from local
business is affirmed, it would be difficult to deny it in a particular case by
attributing "unconstitutional" motives for its exercise. Clearly the effect
of exclusion provisions similar to those in the instant case is only inci-
dentally to compel submission to local jurisdiction; other and perhaps
greater burdens necessarily result.14 The instant case thus reveals a curi-
ous anomaly: the state may require domestic incorporation and thus im-
pose, among many other burdens, the incident of non-access to federal
courts under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction; yet the states may
not offer to foreign corporations the opportunity to escape the other burdens
by accepting the single incident of exclusion from diversity of citizenship
9 Insurance Co. v. Morse, supra note 1; Southern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44 (1892) ; Barren v. Burnside, 121
U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931 (1887); see Martin's Adm'r v. B. & 0. Ry. Co.,
151 U. S. 673, 684, 14 Sup. Ct. 533, 537 (1894) ; Barrow Steamship Co. v.
Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 111, 18 Sup. Ct. 526, 530 (1898).
10 Terral v. Burke Construction Co., supra note 8.
1" St. Louis and San Francisco Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 16 Sup,
Ct. 621 (1896); Southern Ry. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326, 23 Sup. Ct.
713 (1903).
12 Discussion of the merits of the Norris Bill for the abolition of the
diversity basis of federal jurisdiction has focussed attention, not only on
its great historical significance in the development of the country, but also
on the fact that modern economic cosmopolitanism has not eliminated sec-
tional prejudice, especially against corporations. See Brown, op. cit. supra
note 7; Newlin, Proposed Limitations upon our Federal Courts (1929) 15
A. B. A. J. 401; for an opposite view see Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN.
L. Q. 499. Congress has repeatedly refused to enact legislation to exclude
foreign corporations from the federal courts on the ground that they are
not citizens for purposes of diverse citizenship jurisdiction. FRANXFURTEU
AND LANDIs, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) c. 2(4), 3(4).
'a Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 27, 30 Sup. Ct.
190, 197 (1910).
14 The most important respects in which state regulation of a domestic
subsidiary may impose greater burdens than state regulation of the foreign
corporation are taxation and control of security issues.
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jurisdiction. The states may well hesitate, however, before availing them-
selves of the power sustained by the instant decision as a drastic means
of depriving foreign corporations of the right to federal jurisdiction.
PAYMENT OF ADVANCE WAGES IN TRADE CHECKS ON COMPANY STOr
THE practice of paying wages in trade-checks, or scrip, which so often
results in the exploitation of employees by their employers, has led to wide-
spread legislative efforts directed at its abolition. Some statutes have abso-
lutely prohibited such payment; 1 others have sought to discourage it by
giving the holder, whether the employee himself, or a purchaser from him,
the option of redeeming the scrip at its face value in legal currency.2 The
courts have generally sustained the constitutionality of this legislation, -
but they have not always shown keen perception in detecting ingenious
devices to evade its effect. These devices have generally been so contrived as
to make it appear that the scrip sought to be redeemed in money was not
given in payment of wages, and therefore that the statute did not apply
to compel its redemption. So, where the scrip is issued not by the em-
ployer but by a mercantile company, in return for an assignment to it
of the employee's wages then due or about to become due, it has been
held that even though the employer is the sole stockholder the company
need not redeem the scrip, since it was issued indiscriminately to all cus-
tomers of the store, whether or not they were employees.&4 In like manner,
some courts have held that where scrip redeemable in merchandise is issued
between contractual pay days, on the voluntary application of the employee,
it is not issued "in payment of wages" within the prohibition of the statute
but merely represents 'credit' given the employee.5
In the recent case of Radford v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co.,G the
plaintiff brought suit on certain writings, purchased by him from employees
of the defendant, alleging that they were scrip which the lumber company
was compelled to redeem at face value under the redemption provision of
the statute. The instruments read as follows: "Louisiana Central Lumber
Co.: Please charge my account for merchandise amounting to $ , not
to exceed $3.00 (Signature of employee)." The defendant claimed that
these instruments were not issued in payment of wages, but before wages
were earned, and were merely "credit slips" by which the employee was
enabled to obtain credit at the company's store, and which were not charged
I See IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 9338; Ky. CO.NST. § 24-1; 1 & 2
WmL. IV, c. 37 (1331).
2ILL. R V. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 40 § 38; TENN. ANN. CODE
(Shannon, 1927) § 4342 F. La. Acts 1924, No. 210, provides that "any per-
son, firm or corporation issuing checks, punchouts, tickets, tokens, or other
device, redeemable either wholly or partially in goods or merchandise at
their, or any other place of business, shall, on demand of the legal holder
thereof . .. be liable for the full face value thereof, in current moncy of
the United States."
3 Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 183 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1 (1901), afg
103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955 (1899); Mlacbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Van
Blaricum, 176 Ind. 69, 95 N. E. 313 (1911); Atkins v. Grey Eagle Coal Co.,
76 W. Va. 27, 84 S. E. 906 (1915). But cf. State v. Missouri Tie and Timber
Co., 181 Mo. 536, 80 S. W. 933 (1904).
4 Legge v. Junior Mercantile Co., 142 S. E. 259 (W. Va. 1928).
5 Avent Beattyville Coal Co. v. Com., 96 Ky. 218, 28 S. W. 502 (1894).
0 131 So. 765 (La. 1930). For statute see note 2 supra.
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against him until his purchase was made and then only to the amount of
the purchase. It was further testified that the employee could, upon written
'application, receive a cash advance on his wages The court held that the
writings in question were not given in payment of wages within the mean-
ing of the statute, since there was no obligation owed the employee when
they were issued, and no such coercion as the statute was designed to
prevent.
Theoretically the system involved in the principal case might operate
without prejudice to the employee if the prices and policy of the company
store were wholly fair, and the employee was in fact not compelled to use
the scrip. But the necessities of living may constitute such "compulsion in
fact where there is none in law" 8 as will force employees to take wages
in advance. It is significant that the statutes condemning the use of scrip
make no mention of coercion and no distinction between the payment of
wages in advance and payment of wages when due. The fact that the
employer here called the transaction a "credit" does not alter the circum-
stance that wages are actually being paid in scrip, since the value of mer-
chandise purchased with these slips is deducted from the cash given the
employee on the pay day.9 Furthermore, that the company had already
* paid wages without deducting the value of the unused credit slips upon
which suit is brought should not weigh in its favor where it appears that
by this device the employer is given the opportunity both to exploit his
employees and to effect a company store monopoly, the very dangers which
the statute was designed to avert. It is this effect which courts should
properly take as the test of the statutes' applicability.
THE LIABILITY OF AN AccEPTOR OF AN ALTERED BILL or EXCIIANGE
SECTION 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which places liability upon
the acceptor of a bill of exchange "according to the tenor of his accept-
ance," 1 has been held not to alter the common law practice which allowed
a certifying bank to recover the amount paid upon a check altered before
certification, even from a bona-fide purchaser thereof.2 A recent California
Too much weight should not be given this testimony where it does not
appear that the identical slips sued on could be used to obtain cash ad-
vances or that no discount would be made.
8 Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454, 463.
9 See the discussion in Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Riley, Lester & Bros., 171
Ky. 811, 188 S. W. 907 (1916), reaching a different result from the instant
case on facts substantially similar.
I§ 62 reads: "Liability of acceptor: The acceptor by accepting the instru.
ment engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance;
and admits (1) the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signa-
ture, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument, and (2) the
existence of the payee and his then capacity to endorse."
2 White v. Continental National Bank, 64 N. Y. 316 (1876) ; Metropolitan
National Bank v. Merchants' National Bank, 182 Ill. 367, 55 N. E. 360
(1899). See Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 18 Wall. 604, 619 (U. S., 1873).
Accord after the Negotiable Instruments Law: National Reserve Bank v.
Corn Exchange Bank, 171 App. Div. 195, 157 N.Y.Supp. 316 (1st Dep't
1916). See McClendon v. Bank of Advance, 188 Mo. App. 417, 426, 174
S. W. 203, 205 (1915). The Oregon Bank Act contains a provision avoiding




decision, 3 however, following the hitherto unique Illinois 4 interprctation
of this section, and basing its decision upon a strictly literal interpretation
of its words, has reached the opposite result in protecting the bona-fide
purchaser of a certified check in which the payee's name had been altered
before certification.
The main support for such a holding is the argument that it will
strengthen the security of certified checks.5 The results of a recent investi-
gation, however, indicate that the imposition of such liability upon the cer-
tifying bank would materially curtail the practice of certifying cheeks
and it may reasonably be queried whether a restricted use of instruments
of somewhat greater security would be preferable to the general use of
instruments whose security is traditionaM It has been said further that
the drawee bank is better qualified than the purchaser to detect alterations
of a check and to distribute such risks by insurance; s nevertheless, it is
significant that the bank is merely providing a gratuitous service for its
customer, while the purchaser who in fact trusted the fraudulent party,
presumably expects a profit from the transaction and should more justly
bear the attendant risks. Nor is the consideration that the purchaser relied
upon the acceptance persuasive since the reasonableness of such reliance
logically depends upon the extent of the acceptor's warranty, which is the
point at issue. Furthermore, a bill altered before and one altered after
certification offer identical aspects of security to the purchaser, and in the
latter case the purchaser has been denied protection.0 Moreover, "that
sound principle which declares that where one of two innocent partics must
suffer a loss the law will leave the loss where it finds it," Ili is peculiarly
inappropriate here, since the purpose of Section 62 is to fix the acceptor
with definite liabilities.
Although Section 62 is not limited in its scope to certified checks, the
policy which undoubtedly prompted the instant decision would not extend
to the case of ordinary commercial bills of exchange. Even if it were
possible so to word the section as to single out for liability the certifier
of an altered check, the effect of such action would be to subject the certi-
fying bank to double liability, for the original payee has been allowed
recovery from the bank on the theory of conversion."l Furthermore it is
3 Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of Italy, 292 Pae. 281 (Cal., 1930).
4 National City Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, 300 Ill. 103, 132
N. E. 832 (1922).
See Breckenridge and Llewellyn, Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 522;
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) 572.
6 See Turner, A Factual Azalysis of Ccrtain Proposed Amcndnints to
the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 1047, 1060.
7 The American Bankers' Association recommended an amendment to the
Negotiable Instruments Law to avoid the result in National City Bank v.
National Bank of the Republic, supra note 4, but the suggestion was
rejected by the Commission on Uniform State Laws. See REPorr OF Cox-
FERENCE ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1923) 226.
s See Breckenridge and Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 5. If the bank is
negligent, however, the purchaser is protected without § 62. Cf. Conti-
nental National Bank v. Tradesmen National Bank, 36 App. Div. 112, 55
N.Y.Supp. 545 (1st Dep't 1899).
- Cf. Ozark Savings Bank v. Bank of Bradleyville, 204 S. W. 570 (Mlo.
1918).
10 See National City Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, &upra note
4, at 108, 132 N. E. at 833.
11 Cf. Burstein v. People's Trust Co., 143 App. Div. 165, 127 N.Y.Supp.
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difficult to see why a bank certifying an altered check should be in a less
favorable position than one paying it,12 or giving a cashier's, check in lieu
of certification.' 3 Similarly there appears no justification for holding the
bank liable where the payee's name has been altered and endorsed as
changed, and allowing recovery by it where the original payee's endorse-
ment has been forged.' 4  These analogous situations are not within the
scope of Section 62, and consequently the result of the instant decision is to
isolate merely one of thd forms which the transaction might take. If, as It is
thought, this is an undesirable innovation upon the common law rule, not
contemplated by the framers of the act,'5 clarification of the wording of
this section would seem imperative.
RIGHT OF COMPENSATED EMPLOYEE TO SuE THIRD PARTY ToRT-F-AsOR
UNDER most Workmen's Compensation Acts an employer is expressly sub-
rogated to the rights of a compensated employee against third parties caus-
ing the injury.' The question has frequently arisen whether this statutory
subrogation constitutes a bar to an independent action by a compensated
employee against a third party tort-feasor.2 Specifically provided for by
only four compensation acts,3 this situation has produced a confusion of
holdings not entirely explicable by the wide diversity in the subrogation
provisions themselves.4 In a recent Missouri Case, a statute allowing
1092 (2d Dep't 1911); Kansas City Casualty Co. v. Westport Ave. Bank,
191 Mo. App. 287, 177 S. W. 1092 (1915). See BRANNAN, op. Oit. supra
note 5, at 907; Woodward, The Risk of Porger ' or Alteration of 'Negotiablo
hist' uments (1924) 24 CoL. L. Ruv. 469, 476.
'12 Cf. Interstate Trust Co. v. U. S. National Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac.
260 (1919). See Breckenridge and Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 5, at 527.
13 Cf. Central National Bank v. Drosten, 203 Mo. App. 646, 220 S. IV.
511 (1920). A cashier's check is but a substitute for a certified check.
'See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 890.
14 Cf. National Insurance Co. v. Mellon Bank, 276 Pa. 112, 119 Atl. 910
1(1923).
1- See Note (1922) 16 ILL. L. Ruv. 615.
I Of the forty-three state Workmen's Compensation Acts, all have subro-
gation provisions except Arizona, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Utah
.and West Virginia.
". See Note (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 972.
2 See ALA. ANN. CODE (1928) §§ 7586, 758T; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 4291 (2) ; NED. CoATP. STAT. (1929).48:118 (permits compensated employee
to sue third party in his own name if he makes subrogated employer a
party to the acti6n); Wis. STAT. (1929) 102.29 (failure of subrogated
employer to sue third party within ninety days after written demand
entitles compensated employee to sue in his own name).
4 The various types of provisions subrogating the employer to the rights
of his employee in case of third party liability may be classified thus:
(a) Statutes providing that the employee shall receive any amount recov-
ered by the employer in excess of compensation; (b) Statutes with the
same provision as to excess recovery, but requiring the employee at his
option to take compensation or sue the third party; (c) statutes which limit
the employer's recovery to the compensation he has paid; (d) statutes which
permit the employee to proceed either against his employer or the third
party, but not against both; (e) statutes that neither provide for excess
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recovery of full damages by the subrogated employer but providing that
any recovery in excess of the compensation paid or payable was to be
transferred to the employee 0 -was held not to destroy the compensated
employee's right to sue the wrongdoer.
Under the few statutes which specifically prohibit the employee from
proceeding against both his employer and the third party wrongdoer,
acceptance of compensation is uniformly held to be a bar to a subsequent
independent action.7 And where there is no provision regarding the extent
of the employer's recovery or for the disposition of excess recovery, the
employee has been held to have no further right of action if he elects to
take compensation.s Indeed, in at least one state it has been repeatedly
stated that when the employee thus forfeits his common lavw action, the
subrogated employer may recover full damages and retain them for his
own benefit.9
Where, however, the statute subrogates the employer only to the e.xtent
of the compensation paid or payable,o or, as in the instant case, provides
for the disposition of excess recovery by the employer,fL the subrogation has
very generally been held no bar to the employee's suit against the third
recovery, nor limit the extent of the employer's recovery, nor prohibit the
employee from prosecuting two suits.
McKenzie v. Missouri Stables, Inc., 34 S. W. (2d) 136 (Mo. 1931).
6 Mo. REV. STAT. (Minturn Ann. Supp. 1927) § 13672 (a) 10.
7 Barry v. Bay St. Ry., 222 Mlass. 366, 110 N. E. 1031 (1916); Pittsburgh
C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Parker, 191 Ind. 686, 132 N. E. 372 (1921) ; Smith
v. Port Huron G. & E. Co., 217 Mich. 519, 187 N. E. 293 (1922); Nashville
v. Latham, 28 S. W. (2d) 46 (Tenn. 1930). The Massachusetts statute
is a hybrid, preventing the employee from proceeding against both hi
employer and the third party, but providing that four fifths of any excess
recovery by employer should be paid the employee. For dicta to the effect
that under this statute the employee cannot force the subrogated employer
to sue the wrong doer, see Whalen v. Athol Mfg. Co., 242 Brass. 547, 549,
136 N. E. 600, 601 (1922). But cf. McArthur v. Flint Oil Co., 50 R. I. 22G,
146 Atl. 484 (1929).
sHolmes v. Jennings & Sons, 7 F. (2d) 231 (D. Ore. 1921); Eagle-
Picher Lead Co. v. Kirby, 109 Old. 96, 235 Pac. 176 (1925); Anderson v.
Bauer, 146 Wash. 594, 264 Pac. 410 (1928).
9 See Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N. Y. 273, 277,
146 N. E. 377, 378 (1925); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co v. Graham &
Norton Co., 228 App. Div. 45, 50, 239 N. Y. S. 134, 139 (3d Dept. 19j30).
10 Houlihan v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 282 fI1. 76, 118 N. E. 429 (1917);
Black v. Chicago Great Western R. R., 1S7 Iowa 904, 174 N. W. 774 (1919)..
This result finds support in analogy to indemnity insurance cases, which
hold that when an insurer who pays part of the loss is pro tanto subrogated
to the rights of the insured, the insured may sue in behalf of himself and
the subrogated insurer. Kansas City Mf. & 0. Ry. v. Shutt, 24 Okl. 96, 104
Pac. 51 (1909).1 Scalise v. Venzie & Co., 301 Pa. 315, 152 AtI. 90 (1930) ; Smith -. Va-
Ry. & Power Co., 144 Va. 169, 131 S. E. 440 (1926) ; Van Zandt v. Sweet,
56 Cal. App. 164, 204 Pac. 860 (1922). But cf. O'Donnell v. Baker Ice Mrach.
Co., 114 Neb. 9, 205 N. W. 561 (1925), which held that, under a statute
identical with the Missouri statute, the employee must plead and prove the
employer's neglect or refusal to sue the third party in order to entitle the.
employee to maintain the action. This statute, [NEB. CoztP. STAT. (1922)




party for full damages. In such a case he is, of course, required to hold
in trust for his employer a portion of the judgment equal to the amount
of compensation already received.12 Under these two types of subrogation
provisions this same result has been reached even when the statute further
stipulated that the employee may at his option take compensation or sue
the third party, although such a provision might seem to contemplate but
one remedy.13
The court in the instant case reasoned that the provision for disposition
of excess recovery made the conpensated employee in effect the beneficiary
of an express trust, hence a real party in interest and entitled to sue.
Whatever the reasoning, the result seems desirable in view of the fact that
the employee is often forced by necessity to take immediate compensation;
to deprive him, because of this necessity, of his larger common law expect-
ancy, unless his employer sees fit to exercise his subrogation privilege
against the third party, would seem hardly in keeping with the spirit of
the Acts.
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE TRUSTEE FOR FAILURE TO RECORD
IN the recent case of Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank of Pottsville,' a bond-
holder brought suit against the trustee under a corporate indenture for
damages occasioned by the latter's failure to record the mortgage. By provi-
sion of the indenture the trustee was under no duty to record and was to be
liable only for gross negligence or wilful default. As the indenture was
executed in Pennsylvania, the court applied authority of that state, and held
that the exculpatory provisions immunized the trustee from liability to the
plaintiff in this action. The strong and well considered dicta, however, leave
but little doubt that the New York court is committed to the validity of such
provisions wherever executed.
The duties of the trustee under a corporate mortgage are generally speci-
fied in the indenture under which the bonds are issued. Certain obligations,
however, such as the duty to refrain from issuing bonds when it is known
that the funds received therefore are being misapplied,2 and the duty of
protecting funds set aside for the removal of prior encumbrancess have
been implied from the mere existence of a trustee-bondholder relationship,
even though not expressly set out in the indenture. Recordation was early
recognized as such an implied duty,4 but in most modern indentures the
.12 See cases cited supra note 11.
13 Book v. Henderson, 176 Ky. 785, 197 S. W. 449 (1917); Haynes v.
Bernhard, 268 S. W. 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Riddle v. Higley Motor
Car Co., 122 Kan. 458, 252 Pac. 231 (1927). Contra: Tandsetter v. 0-
carson, 56 N. D. 392. 217 N. W. 660 (1928) (under the North Dakota
statute the employee's rights are subrogated to the Workmen's Compen-
sation Fund); State v. Bennett Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 140 Atl. 52 (1928)
(third party a principal contractor by whose sub-contractor the employee
was employed).
1255 N. Y. 260, 174 N. E. 648 (1931), rev'g 134 Misc. 727, 236 N. Y.
Supp. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
2 Frismuth v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 107 Fed. 169 (C. C. A. 2d,
1901), aff'g 95 Fed. 5 (S. D. N. Y. 1899); Rhinelander v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 519, 65 N. E. 499 (1902).
Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 863, 129 N. Y. Supp.
807 (3d Dep't 1911).
4 See Miles v. Vivian, 79 Fed. 848, 851 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897). "Such an
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trustee, as in the instant case, expressly disavows this obligations and in
the only case in which the issue has been directly raised, prior to the instant
decision, exculpatory provisions were held to relieve the trustee from
liability for failure to record the mortgage.0 The New York Appellate
Division, however, has stated in a strong dictum that grounds of public
policy forbid that such provisions should relieve the trustee of the duty to
record.7
The establishment of limits beyond which a party in an advantageous
position lacks power to contract out of responsibility constitutes no new
departure in the common law.8 Moreover, practical considerations seem to
compel the view that recordation should be placed in that class of duties
that may not be escaped by contract9 Corporate bondholders, often widely
scattered, and rarely advised by counsel, are in no position to investigate the
indenture or to ascertain whether the mortgage has been recorded. In a
matter so vital to the security of the mortgage the investor seems justified
in relying upon the trustee,10 whose name often serves as an assurance
implied duty is too strong to be over-ridden by a disavowal that contradicts
the transaction itself .... Such obligations (recordation) are imposed by
law regardless of intention and exist because the trust exists ... because
they are part of the trust itself." Posner, op. cit. infra note 5, at 210.
5 Posner, Liability of the Tnrstec Under the Corporate InAenture (1928)
42 HARv. L. REV. 198, 209, 244; Drinker, Concerning Modcrn Corporate
Mortgages (1925), 74 U. of PA. L. REV. 360.
6Bell v. Title Trust & Guarantee Co. of Johnstown, 292 Pa. 228, 140 Ati.
900 (1928).
7 See Green et al. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 223 App. Div. 12, 16,
227 N.Y.Supp. 252, 257 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 627, 162 N. E.
552 (1928).
8 Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454, 482; Posner,
op. cit. supra, note 5, at 201, p. 14; Llewellyn, What Price Contract (1931)
40 YALE L. J. 704, 732 n. 62.
9 With regard to breach of trust duties other than recordation, general
exculpatory clauses have been almost always held effective in the few cases
in which the issue has been raised, but complaining bondholders have con-
ceded that these provisions were the measure of the trustee's liability,
preferring to direct their attack towards showing that the acts of the
trustee constituted gross negligence, or that they were outside the scope
of the trustee's authority. Cf. Hunsberger v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164
App. Div. 740, 150 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1st Dep't 1914); aff'd, 218 N. Y. 742,
113 N. E. 1058 (1916); Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321
(C. C. A. 3d, 1918). If such an attack is successful, the exculpatory clause
is, in effect, nullified to some e-xtent. Cf. Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co.,
88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (1917) (acceptance of collateral in the form
of mortgages executed by the corporation, instead of mortgages assigned
by the corporation, held to transcend the trustee's powers and hence not
-within the exculpatory provision). Where, however, the trustee expressly
exculpates himself from the responsibility of performing specific duties,
such as the duty to record, such an indirect attack cannot prevail.
10 The court in the instant case relies on the argument that the small
fee earned by the mortgage trustee justifies giving him the power to exempt
himself from liability for failure to record. There is, however, lively com-
petition among trust companies for this type of business, presumably
because it attracts more lucrative business from corporations issuing the




of the safety of the investment.1 1 It is to be hoped that when the problem
is again presented, the New York courts will see fit to distinguish the
instant case as a mere application of Pennsylvania Law.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES RESTRICTING THE USE OF
TRADING STAMPS
A RECENT New Hampshire decision 1 which declares unconstitutional a
.statute imposing a prohibitive tax on the use of trading stamps has re-
opened the whole question of the validity of legislation of this type. Be-
ginning in 1880 there was severe agitation against the use of trading
stamps.2 This agitation arose chiefly' because certain types of business
found the use of stamps highly effective, whereas others did not and feared
their competition. Those stores which made the most frequent repeat sales
to the same customer, i. e. the grocery as opposed to the hardware store,
got the best results from their use. Thus clothing and shoe stores, markets,
groceries, laundries, and later gas stations were equipped with an effective
advertising device not available to other businesses. The result was that
statutes were passed in thirty-one jurisdictions either expressly forbidding
stamps or imposing.prohibitive taxes on their use.3 The practice has been
variously called "the imposition of a compulsory, useless, and unnecessary
tax on the entire community" 4 "an industrial parasite"t, and "a lure to
23 ". .. the salability of the bonds depends in no inconsiderable degree
upon the character of the persons who are selected to manage the trust.
If they are of well known integrity and pecuniary ability, the bonds are
more readily sold than if this were not the case. It is natural that it
should be so ..." Merrill v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 24 Hun. 297,
299 (N. Y. 1881). See Northampton Trust Co. v. Northampton Traction
Co., 270 Pa. 199, 202, 112 Ati. 871, 872 (1921) ; Posner, op. cit. supra note
5, at 199.
1 State v. Lathrops-Farnham Co., 150 AtI. 551 (N. H. 1930).
2 The trading stamp business consists of the sale of checks or stamps
to merchants who issue them to customers making cash purchases, the num-
ber of stamps given out being determined by the amount of the purchase.
When presented at the trading stamp store, or often at the store where
the purchases were made, they entitle the holders to select certain articles
from a catalogue or display of merchandise.
sAla., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Iowa, Ind., Ky., La., Md., Mass.,
Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., N. C., N. H., N. Y., Ore., Pa., R. I., S. C.,
Tenn., Utah, Va., Vt., Wash., W. Va., D. C., Hawaii.
4 "One of the most shrewdly planned of the devices to secure something
for nothing . . .With no stock in trade but that device and the necessary
books and stamps and so-called premiums with which to operate it success-
fully, they have intervened in legitimate business between seller and buyer,
not for the advantage of either, but to prey upon both.... The merchant
who yields to their persuasion does so partly in the hope of obtaining the
customers of another and partly through fear of losing his own if he
declines. Again, a limited number only are included in the list for distri-
bution of the stamps, and other merchants who cannot enter must run the
risk of losing their trade or else devise some other scheme to counteract
the adverse agency. . . .Unless the premiums are grossly overvalued the
scheme cannot maintain itself." Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 11
App. D. C. 512, 531 (1897). Cf. (1916) 29 HARV. L. Rnv. 779.
5 See State v. Underwood, 139 La. 288, 303, 71 So. 513, 518 (1916).
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improvidence." 6 It has also been contended that the contract between the
holder and the redeemer of the stamps is void for uncertainty and lack of
consideration,7 that much of the profits of the business come from lost or
unused stamps, and that it is an improper appeal to one's gambling
instincts.8
These statutes were immediately contested in twenty-seven jurisdictions
and in twenty-one were held to be unconstitutional as violative of the "equal
protection" and "due process" clauses in the Federal Constitution, and of
the Bills of Rights in the state constitutions9 Trading stamps vere ap-
proved as a novel but lawful form of advertising 10 rather than a "lure to
improvidence," the courts feeling that they encouraged cash sales, "which
are in general more carefully considered than those in which the time of
payment can be deferred." "1 The element of coercion of merchants was
not considered persuasive ' and it was demonstrated to the satisfaction of
the courts that the scheme contained none of the elements of a lottery.13
Thus it would have seemed to be well established that prohibitory statutes
of this sort were an unwarranted interference with a legitimate business
when aimed at the trading-stamp companies themselves 1 4 and an unjust
discrimination against one form of advertising when directed at the mer-
chants who bought and issued them. Statutes purporting to be regulatory
but imposing prohibitive taxes were open to the further objection of unrea-
sonable classification.-
Thus, although the United States Supreme Court is often more lenient
in criticizing state legislation than are the state courts ,0 it might have
6 Rast v. Van Deman-Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 365, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 377
(1916).
7 See State v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 110 Minn. 37S, 381, 126 N. W.
120 (1910).
s See Commonwealth v. Emerson, 165 Mlass. 146, 148, 42 N. E. 559 (1896).
9 Cal., Colo., Ga., Hawaii, Ind., Iowa, Ky., BMd., Mlass., Mich., Mlont., Neb.,
N. C., N. H., N. Y., R. I., S. C., Tenn., Utah, Vt, Va. Comtra: Ala.,
D. C., Minn., La., W. Va., Wash.
10 See Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 869, 45 S. E. 327, 331
(1903).
11 See Denver v. Frueauf, 39 Colo. 20, 37, 88 Pac. 389, 395 (1906).
12 Such argument would apply equally well to any form of advertising
or labor-saving device. Cf. State v. Ramseyer, 73 N. H. 31, 39, 58 At.
958, 962 (1904).
I3 The articles to be given as premiums are generally on display and
visible to customers. There is no doubt but that if the collector gets to-
gether a certain specified number of stamps he will be given the choice
of a definite value in merchandise from a definite collection or catalogue.
Furthermore, it Has been held repeatedly that although (1) the stamps
are redeemed by a party other than the one from whom the purchaser
obtains them, (2) the premium is dependent on the asquisition of a certain
number of stamps and (3) the article to be chosen is not definitely namcd.
nevertheless the scheme is not invalid as a "lottery" or "gift-enterprise."
State v. Shugart, 138 Ala. 86, 35 So. 28 (1902); State v. Ramseyer, aupra
note 12; Denver v. Frueauf, supra note 11; State v. Caspare, 115 31d. 7,
80 Atl. 606 (1911) ; State v. Lutey Bros., 55 Mont. 54.5, 179 Pac. 457 (1919).
-4Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky. 394, 247 S. W. 14 (1921).
25 Hewin v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 723, 49 S. E. 765 (1905); Opinion of the
Justices, 226 Mlass. 613, 115 N. E. 978 (1917).
16 It has been especially tolerant in allowing expansion of the "police
power" category of states' rights since its inclusion under the term "due
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been expected that when the matter was first presented for its considera-
tion, it would have been influenced by so strong an expression of state
opinion. Yet that court, through Mr. Justice McKenna, upheld statutes
prohibiting the use of trading stamps 17 after a parade of "imagined hor-
ribles" and on general grounds of public policy.'8 Not a case in point was
cited and reliance was had solely on references to extreme cases of inter-
ference with private enterprise, which the court had sanctioned. The
decision was even more striking when contrasted to the well-defined policies
of the Supreme Court in other matters, notably with respect to the preven-
tion of discounts by resale price-fixing agreements. In this field the court
has consistently allowed retail merchants to cut prices as they choose.19
Since these decisions there has been a break in the uniformity of con-
demnation of trading stamp statutes. They have been contested fourteen
times 20 and upheld in half of the decisions, 21 but the effect if any of this
change of judicial attitude upon the actual use of stamps has not been
appreciable. The volume of business of the chief concern engaged in
selling stamps has increased steadily for the last ten years, and even in
face of the present widespread business depression, has not decreased since
process" by Justice Field in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (1885).
17 Rast v. Van Deman-Lewis Co., supra note 6; Tanner v. Little, 240 U.
S. 369, 36 Sup. Ct. 379 (1916); Pitney v. Washington, 240 U. S. 387, 36
Sup. Ct. 385 (1916).
18 "The schemes of complainants ... tempt by a promise greater than
that of the article and apparently not represented in its price, and it hence
may be thought that thus by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence.
This may not be called in an exact sense "a lottery"; may not be called
"gaming;" it may, however, be considered as having the seductions and
evils of such, and whether it has may be a matter of inquiry, a matter of
inquiry that it is finally within the power of the legislature to make ...
and it is not required that we should be sure as to the precise reasons for
such judgment, or that we should certainly know them, or be convinced of
the wisdom of the legislation." Rast v. Van Deman-Lewis Co., supra
note 6, at 365, 36 Sup. Ct. at 377.
Mr. Justice McKenna answers the objection of arbitrary classification
for purposes of taxation by saying "It is established that a distinction in
legislation is not arbitrary if any state of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived which would sustain it, and the existence of that state of facts
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed." Ibid. 357, 36 Sup. Ct.
at 374.
'9 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Parks, 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911);
Frey & Sons v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct. 451 (1921).
20 Colo., Ga., Ind., Kan., La., Md., Mass., Mich., Mont., N. D., N. H., Utah,
Vt., Wis.
21 State v. Underwood, 139 La. 288, 71 So. 513 (1916); State v. Wilson,
101 Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679 (1917); Olsen v. Ross, 39 N. D. 372, 167 N.
W. 385 (1918); State v. Weigle, 166 Wis. 613, 166 N. W. 54 (1918); State
v. Lutey Bros., 55 Mont. 545, 179 Pac. 457 (1919); State v. J. M. Seney Co.,
134 Md. 437, 107 Atl. 189 (1919); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188
Ind. 173, 122 N. E. 584 (1919). The Montana and North Dakota cases
are not direct holdings in favor of the statutes, but seem to assume their
constitutionality. Only four jurisdictions, Ind., Kan., Md., La., have ex-
pressly followed the Rast case, and only two of these involved a real
change of attitude, the matter never having been raised before in Kansas,
and Louisiana having earlier tacitly adopted the same policy. State v.
Merchants Trading Co., 114 La. 529, 38 So. 443 (1905).
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last year. This may in part be explained by the fact that the statutes
in question are now less rigorous, some of them exempting trading stamps
redeemable by the merchant who makes the sale22 and some exempting
stamps redeemable in cash either by the merchant who issues them or by
a third party.2 3 Moreover, an examination of the decisions themselves,
reveals that in seven jurisdictions the right of the legislature to prohibit
trading stamps has been expressly denied 2 4 and that the particular statute
under consideration has been upheld in only three.-5 In the remaining four
instances the court, while recognizing the general right of the legislature
to regulate the business, has declared the particular statute void as arbi-
trary or discriminatory. 26 The instant court considers the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court and expressly discards it. Thus the latest
judicial pronouncement on the subject is in accord with the weight of reason
and authority in holding trading stamps to be a legitimate business device
and in defeating as unconstitutional any attempt to prohibit their use.
22KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 19, art. 2210; Wis. STAT. (1929)
c. 134.
2 3 KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 19, art. 2210; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby,
1924) Art. 27, § 508; N. D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) c. 38, § "V02021;
MONT. REv. CoDEs (Choate, 1921) c. 190, § 2430n.
24 United Cigar Stores v. Stewart, 144 Ga. 724, 87 S. E. 1034 (1916);
Opinion of the Justices, 226 Mass. 613, 115 N. E. 978 (1917); People v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 197 Mich. 532, 164 N. W. 503 (1917); Denver v.
United Cigar Stores Co., 68 Colo. 363, 189 Pac. 848 (1921); State v. Holt-
greve, 58 Utah 563, 200 Pac. 894 (1921); Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods
Co., supra note 14; State v. Lathrops-Farnham Co., supra note 1.
- State v. J. M. Seney Co., State v. Wilson, State v. Underwood, supra
note 21.
20 State v. Lutey Bros., Olsen v. Ross, State . Weigle, Sperry & Hut-
chinson Co. v. State, supra. note 21.
An attempt has been made to explain this confusion of cases by pointing
out that there are in general three types of statutes: (1) statutes against
gaming and lotteries in general; (2) statutes against stamps redeemable
either by the merchant issuing them on sales of goods or by a third party;
(3) statutes against the redemption of stamps by a third party only. It is not
apparent how this classification serves to explain the contradictions of the
matter. The first types mentioned are irrelevant (supra note 13) and
there is no distinction in principle between the second and third types. It
is admittedly unconstitutional to prevent the issuance of coupons redeem-
able by the issuing merchant himself. Hence it is difficult to see any
legitimate basis for discrimination. People v. Dycker, 72 App. Div. 308,
76 N. Y. Supp. 111 (3d Dep't 1902); State v. Dodge, 76 Vt. 197, 56 At.
983 (1904). See Young v. Commonwealth, su.pra note 10, at 86G, -15 S. E.
at 330; State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., supra note 7, at 393, 126 N. W.
at 124. The constitutionality of the last-mentioned practice is expressly
recognized in the latest Wisconsin statute on the subject. Wis. LAws
(1929) v. 134.
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